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This paper studies the effect of output-price uncertainty in an industry 
comprised of labor-managed firms (LMFs) in which the number of LMFs 
and their membership are determined endogenously. The exit condition for a 
risk-averse LMF member is formulated and the effect of various economic 
variables on the equilibrium quantities and prices are examined. We find that 
the equilibrium in our setting is similar to the one that emerges in a 
‘capitalistic’ economy where firms are owned by profit-maximizing agents. 
However, the effects of increases in risk and risk aversion differ from those 
found in a short-run analysis of a single LMF. 
 






In the last two decades, traditionally socialist, centrally planned, Eastern European 
economies have implemented economic liberalization, tending towards a free-
market economy. In these economies, however, cooperatives and labor-managed 
firms (LMFs) still occupy a significant position in the production sector, especially 
in agriculture. The development of the LMF sector in the former Soviet Union 
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following the acts of 1987, which legalized private enterprises in the form of either 
individual or cooperative production, is examined by Plokker (1990). The 
estimated number of cooperatives in the former Soviet Union in 1989 was over 
100,000.  
It is well known that firms operating in such economies face an unstable 
environment, and are exposed to risks of all kinds. In the long run, LMFs can only 
survive in a competitive environment if members, within the cooperative, enjoy 
their respective reservation utility level, available to them elsewhere. The principal 
motivation for this paper is derived from an interest in studying the survival 
prospects of such LMFs in the presence of opportunities to their members in other 
sectors of the economy. To accomplish this, the paper develops a positive theory, 
describing the equilibrium of an industry that consists of LMFs which face risk. By 
terminating their membership, LMF members have the opportunity to be hired by 
capitalistic firms in other industries.  
The LMF phenomenon is not unique to eastern Economies: these firms 
comprise a significant sector in western economies as well. For example, the 
Italian LMF sector, the largest in Western Europe, consists of 11,000 firms and 
half a million laborers (Estrin, 1985). Other examples include the UK and France, 
where there are about 1,400 and 1,000 firms, respectively. In Israel, the LMF 
sector is comprised of 270 “kibbutzim", populated by 125,000 members. The 
findings of this paper are directly relevant to the study of these LMF sectors in 
western economies. In particular, government market interventions by means of 
minimum wage, subsidies/taxes and stabilization schemes are common in most 
western economies. The framework developed in this paper can be applied to a 
study of the consequences of such interventions in the LMF sector.  
Moreover, as observed by Sexton (1984), eastern LMFs “are closely analogous 
to agricultural marketing cooperatives. Cooperatively processing and marketing the 
raw labor input is conceptually very similar to processing and marketing a raw 
agricultural commodity such as milk or grain.” (p. 429). Specifically, he noted that 
the LMF theorists explore the same range of solutions as those developed by the 
agricultural cooperative theorists. Therefore, the theory developed in this paper is 




Literature Review  
 
The initial motivation for the analysis of LMFs was derived mostly from an 
interest in the Yugoslavian experiment of self-managed firms which started in the 
early forties. To explain the behavior of those firms, a theory of a Labor-Managed Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk  21
Firm (LMF) under certainty was developed by Ward (1958). The theory has been 
extended by many others, most notably Domar (1966).  
Although this literature is diverse, there are three principles which are 
generally accepted. First, the objective of the members (owners-operators) of the 
LMF is the maximization of profit per laborer. In the case of marketing/processing 
cooperatives, this would mean maximization of profits per unit of raw product, 
supplied by members. The second principle is that capital and all other non-labor 
inputs are purchased from free markets at given prices. Third, instead of paying 
wages, the LMF divides its net revenue of non-labor costs equally among its 
members.  
In later years, the literature evolved to account for risk and uncertainty, e.g., 
Muzondo (1979), Bonin (1980). The analysis was extended to include the long-run 
effects, when both labor and capital are optimally chosen, by Horowitz (1982), 
Kahana and Paroush (1984) and Choi and Feinerman (1991). Dynamic 
considerations and the possibility of learning about the stochastic demand process 
over time were introduced by Horowitz (1992). More recently, the literature has 
been expanded to account for other dimensions of economic behavior and for an 
empirical examination. Hwang, Lin and Mai (2001) introduced space into the LMF 
theory. Neary and Ulph (1997) investigated the possibility of coexistence of a LMF 
and a capitalistic firm in a duopoly. In a recent paper, Podivinsky and Geo (2003) 
employed a panel of UK data to perform an empirical analysis of the determinants 
of entry and exit decisions of LMFs.  
However, with the exception of Haruna (1988), the literature on LMF 
decisions under price risk, thus far, has focused on the individual firm, and ignored 
the industry. Moreover, it presumes an interior solution, ignoring the possibility of 
quitting business, the very point which is the focus of the discussion on industry 
equilibrium. This paper attempts to fill this gap. 
  
 
Modeling Cooperative Decisions under Price Risk  
 
Consider a LMF consisting of many homogeneous members, each of which 
supplies the cooperative with one unit of labor. The LMF’s total profit is given by 
,   Π
 
() ( ) lkprT p Qlk r k T Π,,,, = , − −,  
 
where T  denotes fixed cost, l  is the total labor input measured in laborers,   is a 
capital input,   is a capital-input price and 
k
r p  denotes the random output price. 
The random output price is given by  p µ γξ ≡ +,  where 0 γ ≥ , () 0 E ξ = , Ziv Bar-Shira, Israel Finkelshtain and Avi Simhon  22
() 1 V ξ = , and  ( hS ) µ β =, . The function   decreases with   - the total 
industry output, and increases with 
h S
β  – a demand shifter (e.g. an immigration 
wave or taste change). The production function,  ( Qlk ) , , is assumed to be 






























The cooperative members choose l  and  , ex-ante, so as to maximize the 
expected value of the von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function, U , defined 
over profits per cooperative member:  
 
[ U r πρ , ,  
 
where  l
Π  is the profit per laborer
1. The utility function U() π,  is assumed 
to be differentiable in the index of risk aversion,  , and twice differentiable, non-
decreasing, and concave in  . The subjective cumulative distribution function of 
,  , is assumed to have finite moments.  
Employing the notion of a cost function, the cooperative’s choice problem can 
be described in an equivalent form, involving a two-stage solution. In the first 
stage, the optimal mix of l  and   is chosen so as to minimize the cost per 
cooperative member for a given level of output per member,  Q l / . The 
minimal cost per cooperative member, to produce a given amount of output per 










Focusing on an industry equilibrium, we assume a long-run planning horizon, 
namely the LMF can optimally choose both inputs,   and l , in which case 
. However, for the sake of completeness and comparison with previous 
studies, a short-run analysis with fixed capital and positive fixed cost will also be 
considered in the last section of the paper.  
The necessary conditions for an interior solution of the above cost 
minimization problem are given by  
 
1   The labor input   is treated as a continuous variable. This poses no problem for the 
meaning of l  as the number of members as long as the labor unit is small relative to the 
total labor input. When there is only a small number of members,   cannot be 
interpreted as an undetermined number of laborers.  
2   Obviously,   is a function of   and T , as well. For the sake of clarity these 
parameters are subsumed. 
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where subscripts of a function stand for partial derivatives with respect to the 
subscript and λ  is the Lagrange multiplier
3.  
Further insight may be gained by combining these two conditions, yielding  
 
lk Ql Qk Q + =.  
 
This last condition is referred to as a local constant return to scale (CRS) condition 
(e.g. Estrin 1985). It states that at the optimum, the production function exhibits a 
CRS. As in the case of a capitalistic firm, if the production function of a LMF is 
linearly homogeneous (exhibits global CRS), then the profit-maximizing second-
order conditions are not satisfied and equilibrium output is indeterminate. 
However, under CRS, the cost-minimization problem of a capitalistic firm yields, 
in general, a unique solution, whereas the solution for the analogous problem of a 
LMF is not unique (all input bundles that produce q  cost the same).  
The second stage of solving the cooperative problem is to utilize   for the 
maximization of expected utility, defined, as before, over profits per cooperative 
member. However, the choice variable in the second stage is the cooperative output 
per member, rather than the levels of the two inputs l  and  . Formally, the 
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The necessary condition for an interior solution of the above problem is given by  
 




The two-stage solution must be shown to be equivalent to the direct expected 
utility maximization with respect to the two inputs. As is formally shown in the 
appendix, this assertion is valid since manipulation of the first-order conditions for 
the latter problem yields the necessary conditions for the former one. On intuitive 
grounds, the two-stage solution is justified by the following reasoning: the choice 
of input mixture does not affect the risk faced by the cooperative member. The 
latter is affected only by each member’s level of output. Since the cooperative 
3    The existence and efficiency of a general equilibrium of an economy with LMFs, 
uncertainty and incomplete markets was investigated by Kihlstrom and Lafonnt (2002). 
4   Haruna (1988) did not investigate the optimal inputs allocation and its relationships to 
the LMF’s total output. Accordingly he started his formal analysis with an optimization 
problem identical to our second stage decision problem.  Ziv Bar-Shira, Israel Finkelshtain and Avi Simhon  24
member’s utility increases with π , the input mixture is chosen so as to minimize 
the cost per member for any given level of each member’s output, independent of 
both price risk and risk attitudes. In the second stage, the level of output per 
member is chosen according to the member’s risk preferences. 
 
Properties of the cost and conditional demand functions  
Under the assumption that the production function Q is concave, the cost function 
 is well defined and one can show several properties of   that will be useful 
below. These are formally stated in lemma 1.  
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The usefulness of lemma 2 in the equilibrium analysis which follows lies in the 
fact that it describes the relationships between output per member to inputs 
utilization and total output of the LMF.  
Lemma 2: Let  ,   and Qp be the levels of input and output which 
maximize profit per member when 
ˆ() lp ˆ() kp ˆ()
p  is deterministic; and let lq ()
)





 be the levels of input and output which minimize cost per member for a 
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Lemma 2 states that the effects of a change in output per member on inputs and 
output are qualitatively identical to the effect of a change in output price on them. 
Its power stems from the fact that the behavior of input demand and output supply 
with respect to output price under certainty determines the relationships between 
output per member and output and input use under uncertainty. The outline of the Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk  25
proof is given in the appendix. In addition, we note that when l  and k  are 
substitutes ( ) / complements ( ), then (  is 
negative/indeterminate and   is positive/indeterminate.  




Entry and Exit Decisions of a Risk-Averse LMF  
 
About three decades ago, in his seminal paper, Sandmo (1971) showed that a risk-
averse competitive firm facing output price risk requires a positive expected profit 
to remain in business. Following his pioneering study, extensive research into 
decisions regarding entry or exit of capitalistic firms in the long run evolved in the 
literature (e.g., Flacco, 1983). Flacco generalized Sandmo’s results, showing that 
the competitive firm prefers operating (quitting business) when expected profits 
exceed (fall short of) the risk premium. Later, Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) 
generalized these results to a case in which the producer’s preferences are state-
dependent.  
This section considers the entry and exit decisions of a risk-averse, expected-
utility-maximizer LMF. To date, the entry or exit decisions of a LMF have only 
been analyzed by Haruna (1988). He showed that if the LMF is risk-averse, then 
output per worker is determined when the expected output price equals marginal 
cost plus marginal risk premium. Moreover, assuming that in industry with free 
entry LMFs would continue to enter as long the expected utility is positive, he 
found that a risk-averse LMF will produce less output per worker than that for 
which average cost is at a minimum.  
Our analysis extends Haruna’s results in a few directions. Firstly, we assume 
that a representative laborer will join the LMF as long as his expected utility 
exceeds the utility from his opportunity wage, which need not equal zero as, 
implicitly, assumed by Haruna. Secondly, this assumption is utilized to 
characterize an expected price level threshold in terms of the sum of cost per 
member, opportunity wage rate, and the member’s risk premium, all averaged by 
the output level per laborer; under which the LMF is indifferent between remaining 
and quitting the industry. Finally, we examine the impact of an increase in price 
risk and degree of risk aversion on the expected price threshold and discuss its 
economic implications.  
In the absence of uncertainty, laborers prefer being members in the cooperative 
as long as the dividend per cooperative member,π , exceeds the alternative wage, 
. If this condition is not satisfied, the cooperative is dismantled and its members 
are hired by other firms. Proposition 1 establishes the analogous condition under 
price risk and demonstrates that the larger the risk or risk aversion, the larger the 
expected price required for the cooperative to survive in the industry.  
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Proposition 1: (i) A positive level of output is produced by the LMF in the long run 
if and only if  







where φ  is the individual member’s risk premium and   is the ongoing wage 
rate available for hired laborers in other industries.  
w
(ii) Call µ
∗ the level of expected price for which the cooperative members are 



















The first part of the proposition states that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the cooperative to remain in (quit) the industry is that the expected price exceed 
(fall short of) the sum of the cost per member, opportunity wage, and the risk 
premium, all averaged by the output per member. The second part of the 
proposition states that the expected output-price threshold, for which the 
cooperative members are indifferent between staying in business and quitting it, is 
increasing in both the degree of risk aversion and the level of price risk. The proof 
is provided in the appendix.  
Turning to the implications for industry equilibrium, it is again useful to begin 
with the absence of risk. Similar to a capitalistic industry, a competitive LMF 
industry is at a long-run equilibrium when the price equals average cost per 
member, where the latter includes the opportunity wage,  , of the members as 
hired employees elsewhere. Proposition 1 facilitates an analogous characterization 
of the cooperative industry’s long-run equilibrium under risk. It implies that if 
laborers are risk-averse, long-run equilibrium is characterized by expected 
dividend above the normal, thus exceeding the opportunity wage.  
w
The second part of the proposition implies that the evolution of LMF industries 
involves natural self-selection: the LMFs’ members would tend to consist of the 
less risk-averse laborers, while the more risk-averse individuals would prefer being 
hired employees. In addition, an increase in the uncertainty of the economic 
environment would cause more laborers to prefer a risk-free wage as hired 
employees over membership in a LMF.  
An additional insight requires the assumptions that all the LMFs possess 
identical technologies, and have the same beliefs and risk attitudes. Under these 
assumptions, the industry is in long-run equilibrium when the level of output per 
member of each individual LMF and the equilibrium price distribution both satisfy  Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk  27





= ++ .  
 
This condition replaces the traditional “price equals average cost per laborer” or 
zero economic dividend condition governing the long-run equilibrium of the 
industry under certainty. Thus, risk and risk aversion drive a wedge between 
expected price and average cost per member, equal to the member’s average risk 
premium. This latter condition (or its equivalent in expected utility terms), coupled 
with the first-order condition, QQ lk lQ k = + , create the framework for the 
comparative static analysis of the industry to which we now turn.  
 
 
Comparative Statics of LMF Industry under Risk  
 
We shall begin this section with a general framework. In the sequel we will study 
the effects of various parameter changes on equilibrium variables. Propositions 2-5 
are derived under the assumption of a long-run planning horizon, where the LMF 
enjoys full flexibility with regard to its choice of inputs. At the very end, 
proposition 6 is derived under the assumption of a short-run horizon, where labor is 
the only variable input, while capital is fixed.  
For the sake of completeness, the effects of mean-preserving spread (MPS) in 
the output price distribution, which were analyzed by Haruna (1988), are rederived 
in Proposition 3. In addition to Haruna’s results, we present new findings 
concerning the effect of MPS on input use as well as the effects of other 
parameters.  
 
A General Framework  
Utilizing the notion of cost per member to model the LMF’s behavior, we closely 
follow the methodology introduced by Appelbaum and Katz (1986) for the analysis 
of a capitalistic industry. The two conditions that characterize the long-run 
equilibrium of the LMF industry are  
 
( ) [ ( ( ))] 0 q aq EU p C q π µ , = ⋅ −= ,  
 
and  
()[ ( )( ) ] 0 bq EU Uw µ π ,= − = ,  
 
where, as before,  () ph S λ γε =, + . It is useful to illustrate the conditions   
and   with diagrams in the 
0 a =
0 b = µ  and   space. Figures 1a and 1b describe the 
possible locus of pairs of 
q
µ  and   that satisfy either condition  q 0 a =  or b .  0 =Ziv Bar-Shira, Israel Finkelshtain and Avi Simhon  28
Appelbaum and Katz presented analogous figures in the plane of µ  and Q. We 







Totally differentiating the condition  0 a =  and rearranging terms yields  
 












where   denotes the second-order (sufficient) condition for maximization of 
expected utility by a single LMF, which is negative by assumption. Assuming 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), Sandmo’s technique can be used to 
show that the denominator is positive, implying that the locus 
SOC ...
a  is positively 
sloped, as in Figure 1a. If the absolute risk aversion is increasing, the locus   
may (but not necessarily) have a negative slope, as in Figure 1b.  
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Thus, the locus of µ  and   satisfying the condition  q 0 b =  is a U-shaped curve 
with a minimum where the first-order (necessary) condition  0 a =  is satisfied.  
∗ The equilibrium values of µ  and q , denoted by µ  and  , respectively, 
are achieved at the intersection of the curves  0 a =  and  0 b = . The effect of any 
parameter change on µ  is determined only by the shift of the curve b , an 
upward shift implying an increase in µ  and a downward shift implying the 
opposite. The same effect on  , however, is determined by the relative shifts of 
both   and b  along the line 
q
0 a = 0 = qq
∗ = . For example, inspection of Figure 
1a shows that if b  shifts upward more than  0 = 0 a = , then q
∗  is increased. 
 
Comparative Statics  
We start with a demand perturbation, such that the mean price increases while 
preserving constant variance for every level of the industry supply,  .  
 
Proposition 2: A spread-preserving increase in demand raises industry output, 
and the number of LMFs in the industry. The equilibrium price, output per 
member, use of inputs and total output per firm remain unchanged. These results 
are valid, regardless of assumptions about the measures of risk aversion.  
Proof: A spread-preserving increase in demand is modeled by an increase in λ . 
Such a change only affects µ  and leaves the locus that satisfies the condition 
, or the one that satisfies the condition  0 a = 0 b =  unchanged, ie . . there is 
movement on the curves rather than of the curves. Hence, the equilibrium levels of Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk  29
expected price and output per member do not change. Since   and   are functions 
of only q  and  , which do not change, these variables are left unchanged as well, 
implying that  , output per firm, also does not change. Therefore, the spread- 
preserving increase in demand can only be accommodated by a corresponding 




The above results concerning the industry equilibrium differ substantially from 
the results obtained by others, such as Kahana and Paroush ,(1984); and Choi and 
Feinerman (1991), who focused on a single LMF. Kahana and Paroush showed that 
in the short run, when labor is the only variable production factor, DARA implies 
that the LMF’s membership and output levels both decrease with a spread-
preserving increase in demand. Choi and Feinerman showed that in the long run, 
when both labor and capital are variable inputs, then, in general, the effects on the 
firm’s output and its use of inputs are indeterminate.  
Moreover, the effects of a spread-preserving increase in demand on a single 
capitalistic firm are quite different from its effects on a single LMF. Specifically, 
while the capitalistic firm responds to such a spread by increasing its output level 
(Sandmo 1971), the LMF decreases it. However, when the industry equilibrium is 
considered, the qualitative results for both types of firms coincide and a spread- 
preserving increase in demand does not affect output on input choices.  
A second type of demand perturbation which is worth studying is a mean-
preserving spread in the output-price distribution. This is because, for example, the 
recent trade liberalization in the Eastern European economies may increase the 
variance of price while keeping its mean constant. This issue is studied in 
Proposition 3, which is proved in the appendix.  
 
Proposition 3: A mean-preserving spread of the price distribution leads to:  
(i)   an increase in the equilibrium expected price and a decrease in industry 
supply;  
(ii)  a reduction in output per member;  
(iii)  a decrease (increase) in both l  and  , if they are positively (negatively) 
affected by an increase in output price under certainty;  
k
(iv)   a decrease (increase) in the LMF’s output and an indeterminate change 
(decrease) in the number of LMFs, if output supply under certainty is 
positively (negatively) sloped.  
Corollary: If labor is an inferior (normal) input and capital is a normal (inferior) 
one, then an increase in risk decreases (increases) the LMF’s output, increases 
(decreases) the number of laborers and decreases (increases) capital use.  
The proof of this corollary is immediate when noting that, as shown by Choi 
and Feinerman (1991), the LMF’s supply curve under certainty is positively 
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(inferior) one. Our qualitative results regarding the equilibrium values of output 
price and industry output are identical to those derived by Appelbaum and Katz 
(1986) for a capitalistic industry. Turning to the effect of mean-preserving spread 
on the equilibrium output level of a single firm, Ishii (1989) showed that, for a 
capitalistic industry, an increase in γ  decreases Q and ambiguously affects the 
number of firms, even if DARA is assumed. If the LMF’s supply curve under 
certainty is upward sloping, then the same result is obtained with regard to the 
LMF’s output level (proposition 3). However, if the supply curve under certainty is 
downward sloping the result is reversed, namely, mean-preserving spread increases 
the LMF’s output level. Moreover, in the latter case, proposition 3 also shows that 
in equilibrium the number of LMFs,  , decreases.   n
It can be inferred from the analysis for a single LMF in the short run that 
DARA implies a reduction in equilibrium output in response to mean-preserving 
spread. Extending the analysis of a single LMF to the long run, Choi and 
Feinerman (1991) found that the effect of mean-preserving spread on the LMF’s 
output level is ambiguous. The current study further extends the analysis by 
considering the long-run industry equilibrium and obtains unambiguous results 
with regard to the effect of mean-preserving spread on  , depending on the slope 
of the LMF’s supply curve under certainty.  
Q
We turn now to an analysis of marginal variation in the risk attitudes of the 
industry participants. This question was never fully addressed in previous studies 
of LMFs under price risk. However, a partial study of the subject is provided by 
Choi and Feinerman (1991) who compared risk-neutral and risk-averse LMFs. 
Since in real life various degrees of risk aversion are observed rather than only risk 
neutrality or risk aversion, a marginal analysis is of interest and is conducted in 
Proposition 4, which is proved in the appendix.  
 
Proposition 4: An increase in risk aversion leads to:  
(i) an increase in the equilibrium expected price and as a result, a decrease in 
industry supply;  
(ii) indeterminate changes in output per member, input levels, LMF’s output and 
number of LMFs in the industry.  
It is somewhat surprising that while the effect of an increase in price risk can 
be inferred once the slope of the supply curve under certainty is known, the effect 
of an increase in risk aversion is ambiguous. These results are consistent with those Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk  31
of Choi and Feinerman (1991) who compared the behavior of risk-neutral and risk-
averse LMFs and found that the impact of risk aversion is, in general, ambiguous
5.  
The long-run viability of a cooperative firm depends on the alternative wage 
available to the laborers in other firms. It is therefore important to examine the 
effect of this reservation wage on the equilibrium of the LMF industry. This issue 
is investigated in proposition 5.  
 
Proposition 5: An increase in the reservation wage,  , leads to:   w
(i)   an increase in the equilibrium expected price and a decrease in industry 
Supply, and assuming DARA,  
(ii)   a rise in output per member;  
(iii)  a decrease (increase) in both   and  , if they both decrease (increase) in 
output price under certainty;  
l k
(iv)  an increase (decrease) in the LMF’s output and a decrease (indeterminate 
change) in the number of LMFs, if the LMF’s output supply is positively 
(negatively) sloped.  



















Thus, regardless of any specific assumption about the measures of risk aversion, an 
increase in the reservation wage must increase the mean price, resulting in a 
reduction of industry output. Since a change in the reservation wage does not affect 
the condition  , the increase in expected price implies an increase in output 
per member if the condition a
0 a =
0 =  is upward sloping. The latter is ensured by 
DARA. The proof is completed by considering the effects of a change in output per 
member on l , k  and   established by lemma 2 above.   Q
 
Corollary: If labor is an inferior (normal) input and capital is a normal (inferior) 
one, then an increase in reservation wage increases (decreases) the LMF’s output, 
decreases (increases) the number of laborers and increases (decreases) capital 
use.  
 
The proof is similar to that of the corollary following proposition 3, and is 
available upon request. The results regarding the equilibrium values of expected 
 
5   It is worth mentioning, however, that Choi and Feinerman showed that if labor and 
capital are substitutes and labor is inferior, then a risk-averse LMF produces more than 
a risk-neutral LMF.  
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price and industry output are similar to those derived by Appelbaum and Katz 
(1986). If inferior labor and normal capital are assumed, our findings with regard 
to output per firm also coincide with their result, which does not depend on factor 
characteristics. However, assuming inferior capital and normal labor, the result 
derived here, with regard to firm output, is opposite to the one derived by 
Appelbaum and Katz.  
The analysis conducted so far presumes that all inputs can be optimally chosen 
by the LMF, namely a long-run planning horizon is assumed. For the sake of 
completeness and comparison with previous studies, in proposition 6 we assume 
that capital is fixed and perform a comparative static analysis with respect to fixed 
cost, T . The proposition is proved in the appendix.  
 
Proposition 6: Regardless of any specific assumption about the measures of risk 
aversion, an increase in fixed cost leads to:  
(i)   a rise in expected price and a reduction in total industry output;  
(ii)  a decrease in output per member and an increase in the number of laborers;  
(iii)  an increase of the LMF’s output supply and a decrease in the equilibrium 
number of LMFs.  
These results are the same as those derived by Appelbaum and Katz (except the 
one with regard to l  which is not discussed by them). This similarity is not trivial, 
however, since in the current case the fixed cost per member decreases with 
number of employees. It is also worth noting that without the industry equilibrium 
condition, the capitalistic firm would reduce its output as the fixed costs rise 
(Sandmo, 1971) while the LMF would increase it (Kahana and Paroush 1984).  
 
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks  
 
A recent theme in the economic literature is the rigorous study of alternative 
organizational forms of firms and markets and their implication for industry 
performance. This paper extends the literature on LMFs by allowing their 
endogenous entry and exit and free adjustment of their membership.  
In contrast to previous studies which analyzed the effect of output price 
uncertainty in a market with a single LMF, in our setting the reaction of LMFs to 
changes in price distribution is similar in direction to the effect in a ’capitalistic’ 
economy, but not in its magnitude. The important distinction between an industry 
comprised of LMFs and a capitalistic industry is in the ability of the firm owners to 
diversify their portfolios. In a capitalistic economy, most of the shareholders regard 
idiosyncratic shocks as if they were risk-neutral.  Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk  33
Moreover, short of a catastrophic low-probability event, capitalistic firms 
usually possess enough resources to overcome temporary troughs. In contrast, 
moral hazard issues inhibit cooperative members from insuring against 
idiosyncratic shocks, where they often invest most of their wealth. Since, LMFs do 
not distinguish between wages and profits, they are more susceptible to bad states 
and therefore require a risk premium in addition to the market wage. These 
considerations entail that cooperatives react to risks as if they had a greater risk 
aversion then capitalistic firm owners. 
By Proposition 4, this implies that an economy with LMFs will result in higher 
output prices and lower output than in a capitalistic economy. A way of 
overcoming this problem is for the government to offer insurance either to the 
cooperatives directly or to their members in case the cooperative dissolves. 
There are several directions in which the current analysis can be profitably 
extended. First, the assumption of homogeneous LMFs can be relaxed and the 
analysis may proceed with either inter- or intra- firm differences, e.g. in 
technology, expectations, risk attitudes, or reservation wages due to heterogeneity 
in skills. 
Second, since many LMFs face technological risk, it is important to extend the 
framework to accommodate this additional risk source. Third, a real challenge for 
future research is the formulation of an equilibrium model allowing coexistence of 
both capitalistic firms and LMFs. Such a study may facilitate the investigation of 
three important issues: i) conditions under which both types of firms can (or 
cannot) coexist; ii) the effects of the share of each organization form on industry 
performance; and iii) the effects of exogenous parameters, such as governmental 
policies, on the long-run industry share of each organization type.  Ziv Bar-Shira, Israel Finkelshtain and Avi Simhon  34
Appendix  
Proof of the Equivalence between the Direct and Two-Stage Maximizations  
The expected utility maximization with respect to the two inputs and the first of the 
two-stage maximizations is expressed formally as:  
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where  λ  is a lagrange multiplier. Multiplying the conditions by   and  , 
respectively, equating the two right-hand sides, and dividing by 
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Multiplying the conditions by   and  , respectively, equating the two left-
hand sides, and dividing by   gives:  . Thus, if a choice of 
 and   solves the maximization in ( ), it also solves the minimization in ( l k A B ).  
 
Corollary: Problem (A) is equivalent to max ( ( )) q Ep q cq −  where   is the 




Outline of the Proof of Lemma 2  
 
The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) of lemma 2 are immediate when comparing the 
consequences of comparative static results from the following two systems.   Competitive Equilibrium of an Industry with Labor Managed Firms and Price Risk  35
1. Total differentiation of the first-order conditions resulting from profit 
maximization   and  0 k pQ r −= 0 l pQl pQ rk − +=  with respect to l ,   and  k
p . 
2. Total differentiation of the local CRS condition resulting from expected-
utility maximization and the definition of output per member  0
k
lk l q QQ + −= 
and  0
Q
l q −= with respect to l ,   and q .   k
The proof of part (iii) of Lemma 2 follows by differentiating the production 






















and using parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1:   A representative laborer prefers to be a cooperative 
member as long as his expected utility exceeds the utility from the opportunity 
wage, i.e.  
() i
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where  () E π π ≡ . Since U  is monotonically increasing, the above condition can 
be rewritten as  
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() ii  note that µ
∗ is defined by  
 









where   is the level of output when the right-hand side is at a minimum. Since  q
∗ φ  
is increasing in both γ  and ρ  (e.g. Diamond and Stiglitz 1974) for every given 
level of  , it follows that the right-hand side is increasing in these parameters and 
its minimum is increasing as well, thereby completing the proof.  
q
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Proof of Proposition 3:   Formally, mean-preserving spread is modeled by an 
increase in 
() i
γ . Now, recall that the effect on the equilibrium expected price is 
solely determined by the shift of the locus  0 b =  (see Figures 1a and 1b). 
Following Sandmo (1971), it can be shown that for every risk-averse firm, 
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π  implying that, regardless of 
specific assumptions about the measures of risk aversion, a mean-preserving 
increase in the price variance necessarily increases the equilibrium mean price 





 Now we have to consider the relative shifts of the curves   and 
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The numerator of the last expression is positive, independent of assumptions 
regarding the measures of risk aversion. If the LMF exhibits DARA, then the 
denominator is positive (Sandmo 1971), and the curve b 0 =  shifts upward less 
than the curve  . In this case,   decreases (see Figure 1a). If the measure of 
absolute risk aversion is non-decreasing, then the denominator might be negative 
implying that the curve b
0 a = q
0 =  shifts upward more than the curve  . 
However, inspection of Figure 1b shows that this case also results in a reduction in 
. Therefore, an increase in the price risk reduces the output per member 





 The proof of this part is an immediate consequence of lemma 2.  
 By lemma 2, a positively sloped supply curve under certainty implies 
that a decrease in output per member will decrease the LMF’s output. Since both 
the industry output and the LMF’s output decrease, the change in the number of 
firms is indeterminate. If, however, the supply curve is negatively sloped, the 
reduction in   leads to an increase in  . The latter, coupled with the reduction in 
industry output, yield a decrease in the number of LMFs in the industry.  
q Q
 
Proof of Proposition 4:   An increase in risk aversion is modeled by an 
increase in 
() i
ρ , a parameter that increases the concavity of the utility function. 
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Thus, the sign of the above derivative is opposite that of  () () EU U w ρρ π − . But  
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where 
1() F π  is the probability distribution function of π  induced by the 
distribution of  p , and 
2() F π  is the degenerate distribution of  . Integrating 
the right-hand side of the last equation by parts twice yields  
w
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where   is an integration variable. The first term,  , is negative by the 
definition of  . Since the distribution   is less risky, the second term,  π










() ii  The effect of an increase in risk aversion on q
∗  depends on the relative shifts 
of the curves   along the line  0 ab =,= 0 qq
∗ = . Unfortunately, the difference  
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cannot be signed, therefore the effect on q  is indeterminate. Since l ,  ,   and 
 are all determined by the level of 
k Q
n q
∗  the effects of an increase in ρ  on these 
variables are also indeterminate.  
 
Proof of Proposition 6:   The effect of an increase in fixed cost on the expected 
price is found through the condition b
() i
0 = , evaluated at a predetermined level  
















Thus, an increase in the fixed cost must increase the mean price and reduce 
industry output.  Ziv Bar-Shira, Israel Finkelshtain and Avi Simhon  38
() ii
a
 To further explore this case, we have to consider the relative shifts of the 
curves   and b  along the line  0 = 0 = qq
∗ =  for a fixed k . The difference 
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The sign of the numerator is the same as  . In this case  ()
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which is clearly negative in this case. Hence, the numerator is negative, regardless 
of the assumption on the measures of risk aversion. If the denominator is positive 
(absolute risk aversion is decreasing), then the curve  0 b =  shifts upward less than 
the curve  0 a =  and, as implied by Figure 1a,   decreases. If the denominator is 
negative, the curve   shifts upward more than 
q
0 b = 0 a = . However, as implied 
by Figure 1b, q  also decreases. Thus, an increase in fixed costs reduces the output 
per member, regardless of assumptions on the measures of risk aversion. The 








∂  is negative.  
) ( iii  There are two ways of seeing why the LMF’s output increases: first, it is 
implied by the increase in  ; second, in this case,   moves in the opposite 
direction to   (Kahana and Paroush, 1984 ). It follows immediately that the 
number of LMFs decreases.  
l Q
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Figure 1a: Equilibrium with positively sloped supply 
(b)=0 




Figure 1b: Equilibrium with negatively sloped supply 